China Sea. The ASEAN members most directly affected by China's claims sought to deliver a unified message through the joint communiqué that typically follows the ministers' meeting. Leaked records show that several ASEAN foreign ministers favored language regarding possible violations of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and stressing the need for a regional Code of Conduct (COC) in the South China Sea-language clearly directed at China. Vietnam and the Philippines also championed a more specific provision that expressed "serious concern" over possible violations of UNCLOS provisions on Exclusive Economic Zones and noting discussions of Scarborough Shoal, the site of an ongoing Sino-Philippine feud. 1 However, Cambodian Foreign Minister Hor Namhong, the meeting's chair, refused to accept that language, citing a lack of consensus and arguing that ASEAN should avoid "strong wording" that could "escalate tension." 2 Negotiations broke down, and for the first time in 45 years, no joint communiqué was issued.
To many outside observers, Cambodia appeared to be doing China's bidding, perhaps as payback for years of liberal Chinese aid and investment. A senior diplomat in the region reportedly said, "China bought the chair, simple as that." 3 At least one report suggested that "the Cambodians, in a breach of ASEAN protocol, showed it to the Chinese, who said it was unacceptable unless the South China Sea reference was removed. So the Cambodians sent it back for amendment." 4 6 political gains from China with acceptable costs in autonomy. China has sought resources and fealty on issues of much greater concern to Beijing than Phnom Penh, while incumbent Cambodian elites have sought opportunities for development assistance, personal enrichment, and political entrenchment-all of which the PRC has supported consistently. Over time, however, Cambodia's political economy has evolved to render the country and its elites increasingly reliant on Chinese aid and thus beholden to the PRC's policy concerns. These trends bode poorly for Cambodia's domestic political development, both states' regional relations, and the long-term stability of their bilateral partnership.
AN ASYMMETRIC BUT RECIPROCAL RELATIONSHIP
In its ideal form, a patron-client relationship involves what James Scott has described as an "instrumental friendship," in which a patron of superior power and status deploys its resources and influence to provide protection and benefits to the client, who reciprocates with other forms of support and assistance. 19 The contemporary Sino-Cambodian partnership is highly unequal in material terms. Cambodia's population, gross national product, and military spending are all less than 1 percent the size of China's. While this gives China the clear capacity to benefit Cambodiaespecially in terms of aid and investment-Cambodia is far from powerless in this dyad. Cambodia's natural resources, its roles in multilateral forums, and its geographic position in the heart of Southeast Asia all give it the potential to help advance China's pursuit of economic development and a larger diplomatic and strategic footprint.
Foundations of the Partnership
Chinese and Cambodian officials often speak of the continuity in friendship between the two states, which developed in the 1950s, shortly after Cambodia's independence, during the royalist Sangkum regime led by then-Prince Norodom Beijing, where he was receiving medical treatment, Premier Wen Jiabao lauded his role in building a "profound traditional friendship" between the two states. 21 The contemporary Sino-Cambodian partnership is not a product of habit or historical affection, however. Throughout the latter stages of the Cold War, China and the men who comprise the contemporary CPP leadership were mortal adversaries. In addition to its support for Sihanouk, China backed the Pol Pot regime. The leaders of the CPP-including Hun Sen, Chairman of the National Assembly Heng Samrin, and President of the Senate Chea Sim-defected from Khmer Rouge ranks to lead the Vietnam-backed resistance to the Pol Pot regime and fought the Third Indochina War against PRC-supported Khmer Rouge and royalist forces between 1979 and 1991. 22 It was only in the 1990s that the CPP and Chinese government put aside past animosity to rebuild an instrumental partnership between the two states. After UNsponsored elections in 1993, the CPP brokered a compromise whereby Hun Sen served as co-prime minister with the leader of the royalist Funcinpec party, Sihanouk's son Norodom Ranariddh. As tension rose between the rival parties, China read the tea leaves of Cambodian politics, correctly wagered that the CPP would achieve dominance, and began mending fences with Hun Sen. 23 When CPP leaders sought international support-especially after July 1997, when Hun Sen assumed control in a 20 Hun Sen, Selected Impromptu Address to the Groundbreaking Ceremony for the Enlargement of National Road 6 from PK4 through to Thnal Kaeng under the Presidential Buyer's Credit Loan from the Government of the People's Republic of China, Feb. 14, 2012, www.cnv.org.kh. 21 "Chinese premier visits Cambodian royals for condolence," Xinhua, Oct. 15, 2012 (paraphrasing Wen). 22 During the 1980s, Cambodian royalists led by Sihanouk aligned with the Khmers Rouges as part of a Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) to resist the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia and the Vietnam-backed People's Republic of Kampuchea-the antecedent to the CPP. series of partisan clashes that Western powers widely condemned as a coup-China, which was engaged in a "charm offensive" to extend its economic and political reach in Southeast Asia, seized the diplomatic opening.
Beijing provided Hun Sen with an immediate $10 million loan, declined to join the chorus of the CPP's foreign critics, and provided $2.8 million of military equipment six months later. Facing ostracism from the West, the CPP embraced Chinese assistance and reciprocated by cutting ties with Taiwan. 24 China also gave Cambodia an estimated $600 million in investment and development aid between 1997 and 2005 and backed Cambodia by helping to block a purely international tribunal for the Khmers Rouges. 25 According to Cambodian analyst Chheang Vannarith, "Hun Sen's administration inclined towards China in order to have…political and economic breathing space." 26 Against a backdrop of lingering mistrust, the two governments thus began constructing a partnership based on twin foundations: asymmetrical economic and diplomatic exchange and mutual non-interference on matters of core policy concern.
The relationship has since strengthened considerably, but it remains rooted in word…The Chinese side appreciates the long-standing, firm support of Cambodia for China on issues that concern China's core interests… 27 That statement captured some of the basic elements of the contemporary SinoCambodian entente. China provides economic aid and reliable political defense of Cambodia's sovereignty, and in exchange Cambodia provides access to resources and is deferent on issues of core concern to Beijing-namely the PRC's policies on Taiwan, Chinese dissidents and separatist groups, and perhaps now the South China Sea.
The Importance of Reciprocity
It is precisely this type of reciprocity that distinguishes patron-client dyads from relationships based on coercion or formal authority. 28 Despite highly asymmetric power resources, the Sino-Cambodian relationship is premised on a consensual exchange.
China's limited military reach, the availability of "balancing" options, and its interest in convincing neighbors of its peaceful intentions all lessen the appeal of coercive strategies. There is little evidence that Beijing has attempted to compel Cambodian allegiance through economic threats and no evidence of military coercion. As it has done throughout the region, China has relied more heavily on inducement to pursue stronger ties with Cambodia. Beijing has used its economic largesse and political heft as attractive forces, becoming Cambodia's top investor and aid provider, as well as a key diplomatic friend.
As the literature on social exchange theory suggests, power inequality in reciprocal relationships does not necessarily translate into an exchange of benefits that favors the stronger state. 29 The effective rate of exchange depends on the value that each party attaches to the benefits that the other can provide. For the smaller partner, the net benefits, typically economic assistance and various forms of political or military 27 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People's Republic of China, "Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen Meets Yang Jiechi," July 10, 2012, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t949689.htm. 28 protection, offset to some degree the risks of dependence and diminished autonomy.
The stronger state typically earns access to resources and deference on certain diplomatic matters. It is this political deference that most typically invites critics to label the weaker party a "client" in the pejorative sense of the term.
The degree of policy deference that a small state feels compelled to "pay" for the benefits it receives depends on a number of factors. These include the value of the benefits provided by the stronger partner, the other forms of reciprocation at the weaker state's disposal, and the international context of the interaction. When a great power is eager to build consensual friendships, its weaker partner may be able to extract considerable rewards while conceding little policy deference-or at least deference that carries low political costs. In such cases, an asymmetric bond can become quite strong without generating charges that the small state is a lackey. 
AN EXCHANGE OF BENEFITS
Any reciprocal partnership entails an exchange of benefits. Although China provides substantial economic aid to Cambodia, which reciprocates to some degree with policy deference, the bidirectional flow of benefits is more complex than a simple aid-for-influence swap. China also derives important economic benefits from the relationship, and the Cambodian government gets more than money for developmentit gets assistance in a form that reinforces elite positions in the domestic political economy and buttresses the government against domestic and foreign critics.
The Forms of Chinese Patronage
Cambodian decision-makers have derived a number of benefits from their partnership with China. The most obvious are economic. Although China has invested heavily in economic links throughout Southeast Asia and beyond, its penetration in Cambodia has been particularly great and can best be explained by reference to the structure of Cambodia's domestic political economy, which enables China to operate in the country on favorable terms and makes Chinese investment practices particularly appealing to Cambodian elites. The relationship has also had related domestic political, diplomatic, and security payoffs for Phnom Penh.
Chinese Development Assistance
Chinese aid and investment have provided important benefits both to national development and the pecuniary and political interests of Cambodia's decision-making elites. Official Chinese aid is often difficult to disentangle from ordinary loans channeled through China's state-run banks, because China does not use standard international definitions of official development aid. 30 Volumes of Chinese financial assistance are also difficult to assess due to frequent double-counting in official announcements. Nevertheless, China clearly has become Cambodia's largest foreign investor and donor for large infrastructure projects. "Cambodia-China friendship bridges." 37 Other major Chinese-funded projects include a $3.8 billion beachfront property development project in Kampot, and eight hydroelectric dam projects worth $1 billion. 38 The Chinese firms that typically manage PRC-funded projects tend to have ample experience in energy and infrastructure projects and are relatively efficient providers from a cost standpoint-especially since their projects are normally not "encumbered" by conditions pertaining to environmental protection, labor regulations, or human rights. China is also willing to undertake projects that other donors are not. CPP members control almost all aspects of the bureaucracy and security services, enabling them to command loyalty through the unequal distribution of public resources and selective application of the law. The CPP's bureaucratic grip on society-which has its roots in the 1980s-has also helped the party win over key elite constituencies and much of the general population, which in turn has given the CPP an important source of governing legitimacy and has helped diminish legislative and judicial checks on executive power, which are now extremely weak. The CPP also has used business licenses and lucrative government positions to win the allegiance of key elite constituencies, who channel funds back toward the top of the pyramid of patronage. 47 Managing this system is made easier by the fact that Cambodia's economy relies heavily on natural resource rents and foreign aid, which provide large revenue streams that government officials can distribute to preferred constituencies. To some extent, Cambodia is what Giacomo Luciani has called an "allocation state"-one that relies on the allocation of non-tax revenue to survive rather than the promotion and taxation of productive private economic enterprise. 48 Approximately half of the government's revenue comes from foreign aid alone. 49 Rents from natural resources and land concessions also provide substantial foreign exchange, though the precise volume of official and unofficial flows is difficult to estimate. enact an anti-corruption law, China delivered $600 million in aid. 57 Cambodia's other donors soon followed, pledging a similar figure despite Cambodia's meager progress toward the anti-graft law. 58 Hun Sen lauded the PRC as Cambodia's "most trustworthy friend" and thanked the PRC publicly several months later for not lecturing him on governance and noting that "no condition was imposed, no benchmark was set" for the 60 Scholar Brantly Womack argues, "the international aid community feels that it loses leverage because of China's independent behavior. However, given the needs of Cambodia and the ignorance and arrogance of some international donors, the steadfastness of China's support is appreciated." Womack, China Among Equals, p. 241. 61 John Pomfret, "Clinton urges Cambodia to strike a balance with China," Washington Post, Nov. 1, 2010. Western aid is that the implicit conditions China attaches generally have been the types that CPP leaders are more willing to fulfill.
Preferential Access to Resources and Cheap Labor
Among the implicit conditions of Chinese aid are that Cambodian officials will deal with the PRC largely through bilateral channels and facilitate China's access to encountered opposition from local labor unions or human rights activists, the Cambodian authorities have responded swiftly and harshly. In February 2012, when workers protested for higher pay at Chinese and Taiwanese-owned garment factories in the eastern province of Svay Rieng, the local governor shot into the crowd and wounded three women. He was later fired, but not imprisoned. 92 Again, this appears to be part of an understood quid pro quo; China invests, and Cambodian authorities help minimize local impediments to quick project profitability, often to the detriment of ordinary Cambodian citizens. 93 Chinese investment has brought mixed social results, injecting much-needed capital but contributing to widespread land seizures and environmental degradation. These adverse consequences almost exclusively affect ordinary people, however. Government-linked elites reap the rewards of an economic system marked by low transparency and high corruption, 94 contributing to rapidly rising wealth at the top of the income distribution. 95 Pacts between local elites and foreign investors are hardly unique, but Sino-Cambodian investment practices are particularly unfettered and help give China an edge in seeking resources vis-à-vis many foreign competitors.
Modest Military Support
China derives much less substantial defense-related benefits from its contemporary partnership with Cambodia. Like Phnom Penh, Beijing has a major interest in avoiding strategic encirclement. For China, the relevant circle extends across influence on Cambodia at all. We accept all foreign aid if it is given without conditions." 111 However, that aid did not appear unconditional; it looked instead like recompense for returning Uighur asylum-seekers over strong protests from the international community.
Although deporting the asylum seekers carried little domestic cost to the CPP and China covered for lost U.S. military aid, the episode did subject Cambodia to unwanted international criticism and thus bore some reputational cost. 112 Thus far, Cambodia has not set clear limits on the degree to which it will support Chinese policy interests, but the risks to the CPP of dependency and diminished autonomy are clearly mounting as the partnership takes on a more pronounced patron-client character.
THE RISING COST OF COOPERATION
Until relatively recently, both China and Cambodia appeared to be reaping substantial rewards from their relationship. The partnership also appeared to avoid unacceptable political costs for either party. Despite China's past support for the Khmers Rouges, which both Chinese and Cambodian officials have been loath to discuss, 113 The deal, made with little consultation with area residents, allowed Shukaku and other Chinese partners to begin filling the city's largest lake with sand to support construction of apartments and shopping malls. The sand displaced the lake's water supply and flooded homes in the area, while Shukaku representatives used a mix of threats and compensation offers to evict thousands of people living beside the lake. 121 After a series of public protests and cessation of World Bank lending, the government set aside a parcel of land to house remaining families, 122 but complaints that some families were excluded and that the new complex was flooded prompted new protests. The government repressed them, arresting and jailing several community leaders, which led to further demonstrations and drew criticism from human rights groups. 123 The CPP's political opponents have been keen to capitalize on public frustration improve their management of laws and principles, Cambodia will lose its current resources and there will be no reason for other people to invest in the country. 124 Mu Sochua, an SRP representative, argues that "Cambodia is for sale," and "China is the biggest beneficiary of economic land concessions." 125 non-claimant states in the negotiations. 131 At the November 2012 summit, Cambodian foreign ministry spokesman Kao Kim Hourn announced that "ASEAN leaders decided that they will not internationalize the South China Sea issue from now on"-an assertion the Philippines promptly denied. 132 Cambodia's support for China as 2012 ASEAN chair has brought criticism on Phnom Penh from its neighbors, forcing Phnom Penh to play diplomatic defense.
Cambodia's leaders are clearly sensitive to the risk of being perceived as Chinese clients and losing their independent freedom of maneuver. A reputation for doing China's bidding will likely also hurt Cambodia's efforts to exercise diplomatic leadership in ASEAN, the United Nations, and other forums. Cambodia's relationship with China may have contributed to the weak support it garnered for a UN Security Council seat in October 2012. 133 Kishore Mahbubhani argues that the Chinese victory on the ASEAN communiqué was Pyrrhic, as it compromised a longstanding Chinese effort to accumulate goodwill in Southeast Asia. 134 Analyst Ralph Cossa similarly argues that the episode left China in a compromised position, "where essentially now the spotlight is shining on China's bullying of Cambodia and some of the weaker ASEAN countries." 135 The CPP's long-time political allies in neighboring Vietnam did not criticize Phnom Penh openly, but analysts agree that Hanoi has been upset. 136 In recent years, Beijing has added the South China Sea and disputed territories in the East China Sea to its list of "core interests" alongside Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang. 137 As China's definition of core interests expands and it demands Cambodian support on an ever-wider range of issues, the diplomatic costs of the relationship to Cambodia are bound to rise.
LOOKING FORWARD
For two decades, China has embarked on a "charm offensive" in Southeast Asia, and it has been as successful in building strong government-to-government ties in friends, including China…We expect, therefore, that Cambodia will continue to play its balancing act among great powers…" 139 Indeed, Cambodia's economy does depend to some degree on China, but its largest export market is still the United States, 140 and it has attracted investment, aid, and trade from a number of other sources inside and outside of Southeast Asia. A U.S. firm, Chevron, is likely to be the first to produce oil from the Cambodian deposits in the Gulf of Thailand. 141 Vietnam has also promoted trade and investment in Cambodia, particularly in telecom, retail, and agriculture. 142 Thus far, Cambodia has been free to cultivate ties with China's rivals and has faced little pressure to enter into an unwanted military pact or to take positions that would carry heavy domestic political costs to the CPP. China was itself subject to external predation in the modern past, and Chinese leaders have long understood Cambodian concerns about dependency, which helps explain both the nature and success of its approach to Cambodia.
As China becomes more assertive and confident, however, it is demanding more of its Cambodian friends. China appears to be requesting diplomatic favors with increasing regularity and expanding its demands into more sensitive issues-namely the South China Sea disputes. China's expanding footprint in Cambodia has also raised opposition at home. Hun Sen-a master chess player known for his political cunning and strategic thinking-rose to power during a period of Vietnamese occupation and has spent much of his political career seeking to assert autonomy and control. He now has reasons to set limits on his country's relationship with China or even to reverse course, as the Myanmar generals have done in recent years by opening to the West and thus reducing their reliance on Beijing. 139 Ibid. ¶ 7. 140 Data from the Asian Development Bank, Key Indicators 2012.
141 May Kunmakara, "Cambodia hits oil revenue," Phnom Penh Post, Sept. 28, 2012.
142 "Courting the Khmer," The Economist, June 11, 2011 (arguing that "Cambodia is enjoying being fought over, and plays one off against the other").
The classic small-power game is not so much to avoid patron-client relationships-an effort that would often leave small powers wanting for aid and protection-but rather to make them work to one's advantage. That requires cultivating ties to multiple great powers to build bargaining leverage and reduce a patron's scope for dominance. 143 For more than a decade, Cambodia has enjoyed the fruits of engagement with many competing outside powers, and the country continues to have many willing suitors, but the material and political incentives of Chinese patronage are slowly drawing Cambodia toward an unbalanced foreign policy that threatens to close doors to the outside.
Arresting these trends will not be easy or automatic. As China's role in Cambodia grows, Cambodia's political and economic structures evolve in a manner that renders the country and its decision-makers more susceptible to Chinese pressure.
Cambodia's elites now enjoy an influx of resources that facilitate personal enrichment and near-term political entrenchment. If Cambodian leaders do not rebalance their external relations, the country could face dim prospects ahead. Chinese dominance would likely slow already sluggish governance reform, prompt mounting local unrest, and further impair Cambodia's international standing. CPP leaders thus have ample reasons to resist some of the easy money available from Beijing and the troublesome aspects of patron-client relations that come with it.
